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26 September 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

SUBJECT: Current Status of TR(S)

## I. MISSION

A. Office of Training (Special) is charged with that training conducted in the United States which supports the clandestine services of CIA and which, for operational security reasons, cannot be accomplished by other means. Performance of this mission involves three primary tasks, which are fundamental to all TR(S) activity:

1. To develop in the individual trainee those attitudes and disciplines with respect to security and human relationships which are peculiar to and inherent in all clandestine operations;

2. To provide him with the specific skills and technical abilities which will be required for the successful performance of his particular assigned duties;

3. To make available to him that operationally significant background knowledge which is essential to his understanding of the covert mission of CIA and of his place and function within it.

## II. DISCUSSION

A. TR(S) has recognized from the outset that, given the progressive development of the Agency and the objective of establishing a professional career service, the training problem can, at no time, be static. In any analysis of the problem, it rapidly emerges that there are, in fact, two problems:

1. To satisfy, insofar as existing capabilities and assets permit, the immediate training requirements of a rapidly-expanding Agency;

2. To develop simultaneously and as a fundamental responsibility a long-range training program which will be responsive to increasingly complex and diversified operational requirements.

B. In seeking a solution to this dual problem, TR(S) has attempted three things:

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1. The creation of

1. The creation of a basic organizational structure sufficiently flexible to permit the presentation of a current emergency program, and at the same time to be capable of absorbing new requirements and severe modification of current requirements without the need for frequent, time-consuming reorganizations;

2. The presentation of what must be considered an emergency training program to service the current, abnormally heavy training requirement which has resulted from the rapid expansion of the clandestine services;

3. The concurrent preparation of more highly specialized training materials covering fields where there already exists a small, but significant, requirement, or where it is believed that requirements will inevitably develop in the foreseeable future. Experience to date has shown that, to collect, organize, and authenticate an acceptable two-week unit of instruction in a specialized operational field, has required between eight months and a year.

### III. CONDITIONING FACTORS

A. In undertaking to construct a training program to meet the current requirements of the clandestine offices under DD/P, it has been necessary to take into consideration a variety of factors stemming from the abnormal rate of growth of the operating offices during the past eighteen months. These factors, taken collectively, create a series of problems which can be solved only by an exceedingly flexible pattern of training as described under "Status of TR(S)" below. Taken individually, they are:

1. Time Available for Training. The operating offices, being themselves under heavy pressure to fill out their personnel requirements both at headquarters and in the field, have, in turn, maintained a constant pressure on TR(S) to accomplish the training of new employees in the minimal possible time. This urgency of need for personnel has resulted, in many instances, in trainees receiving either no training at all, or only a portion of the training appropriate to their projected assignments;

2. Variety of Trainee. Personnel trained by TR(S) during the last eighteen months have ranged from very junior personnel just out of college to mature individuals with extensive academic and professional experience in fields other than clandestine operations. While the great majority have had no prior clandestine intelligence experience, a certain number have, in the

past, worked in

past, worked in related areas;

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Paralleling these substantive variations are the equally important variations in level of assignment. Whereas, prior to Korea, the great majority of new employees were at the junior level, the current classes range in projected assignment all the way from junior clerical and operational personnel to station chiefs and persons destined for senior staff positions, with resulting requirements for varying levels of instruction.

4. Variety of Area of Assignment. Since the projected assignments of each student group are widely scattered geographically, training content must consider the extensive variations in operating conditions which the individual students will encounter. This is particularly true in the operational programs where not only must principles be taught, but their application must be illustrated in terms of varying geographic and operational factors, if the instruction is to be valid.

#### IV. STATUS OF TRAINING (SPECIAL)

In carrying out the mission set forth above, TR(S) has established five (5) programs, four (4) of which are instructional, the other being developmental. The instructional programs are:

- A. Basic Training
- B. Advanced Training
- C. [REDACTED]
- D. [REDACTED]

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##### A. The Basic Training Program

This program is designed primarily for new personnel entering the clandestine services or persons without prior training. Its components have been grouped into five (5) major areas, within each of which there is a substantial degree of internal consistency.

The first area, the Basic Orientation Course (4 Weeks), is designed to give the student a knowledge of and basic ability in the establishment and maintenance of human relationships, a working proficiency in the reporting of intelligence and operational information, and that understanding of the over-all U.S. intelligence system required of all members of the Clandestine Services.

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- 3 -  
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The second area, the Operations Course (5 weeks), involves the training of the student in those processes, skills, and techniques which are considered common to all clandestine activity whatever its purpose and character. The successful student should be able to work securely and intelligently in a clandestine operation under direction by a senior operations officer.

The third area, the Staff Indictination/Covert Activities Instruction Courses (4 weeks), involves coverage for the student of the structural and operational regulations, procedures, policies, standards and missions of the Clandestine Services of CIA to the extent that the field officer in an average installation will be held responsible for them. This material is superimposed upon the general study of clandestine activity presented by the Operations Course.

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The fourth area, the Administration Course (2 weeks), is designed to familiarize the student with those administrative and management regulations and procedures to which all junior personnel, both clerical and operational, will be expected to adhere in the field and in headquarters components of the clandestine services.

The basic training in the first four areas, as currently presented, comprises in the opinion of TR(S) an adequate preparation for a normal first desk or field assignment for relatively junior officers who will operate under immediate supervision. It may be considered as roughly equivalent to the training given in a basic Officers Candidate School.

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The fifth area, when added to the first two described above, is considered adequate training for a first assignment to junior officer duties in connection with [REDACTED]

B. The present Advanced

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The advanced courses presently available are designed for the comparatively inexperienced officer who will have a primary responsibility in one (or at most two or three closely related) functional fields of clandestine activity. The instruction aims to develop a more specific understanding of specialized problems and techniques in the particular field of activity under study and to increase professional competence therein. It does not qualify the student as a specialist, but gives him greater knowledge of those problems peculiar to his assignment.

These courses are kept to a minimum length by treating the content of basic training as material with which the students are already familiar, either through prior training or the equivalent in field experience.

Up to the present, these courses have, to the best of our knowledge, satisfied the existing training requirements, although there are certain instances in which truly advanced training of both a specialized and a general nature is requested. For the first time, TR(S) is being called upon to train senior officers for responsible field and staff positions. Special programs have had to be assembled and presented on an ad hoc basis in a number of instances to satisfy the more pressing of such requirements.

### 3. Specialized training

- 3 -  
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A routine field returnee debriefing program is carried on, and when specific requirements justify special debriefing projects lasting as long as three months are carried through. The end product of these research efforts, evaluated and annotated by the senior staff members, is, after validation by the clandestine services, used as the basis for courses of instruction or incorporated into existing courses.

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In addition to these tasks, senior personnel involved in this program have borne a substantial part of the burden of those special training projects in which a higher level of maturity and complexity of instruction than that available in the regular training sections has been required.

#### V. THE PROBLEM

A. The problem which most critically affects TRS and which, in fact, requires this assessment of its current status, i.e., personnel, has been discussed, analyzed, and written about on so many occasions over the past fourteen months that its existence as a matter of serious concern is unquestionably recognized and accepted by the clandestine offices. I do not believe, however, that to date the extent of its complexity and its impact on the future of clandestine training has been fully realized outside the Office of Training. It is for this reason that I have felt it necessary, before examining the problem, to present the background factors set forth above.

B. The personnel problem in TR(S), and its influence on the effectiveness or failure of the TR(S) mission is, first, quantitative, and secondly, qualitative. Both aspects are important, and require comment as follows:

1. On the quantitative side, the rapid expansion in training loads, since January 1951, without concurrent increases in available instructor personnel, has seriously affected desirable instructor/student ratios. This has necessitated extensive modification of training techniques, and has resulted in a lowering of the effectiveness of instruction per training week. The

situation has been

25X9 situation has been particularly felt in the basic training courses, which handle the largest number of students. Where courses, such as the BOC and OC, have been forced to extend from 18 - 25 students per class to [ ] per class, lectures have had to replace discussions, and individual interviews and live problems have either had to give way to group activity, or have had to be restricted to selected trainees. To a somewhat lesser degree, other areas of training also have been affected adversely by sharply-increased requirements; as in the field of covert agent training. Here, the requirement has jumped from 10 - 12 cases per month to as many as [ ] in a single four-week period, without a corresponding increase in instructor personnel. Given the sensitivity of these operations and the need for careful, hand-tailored instruction, it is exceedingly dangerous to have the standard of this training deteriorate. Where, however, a single instructor has been forced to cope with two, and in some instances three, cases simultaneously, such deterioration has been inevitable;

25X1 2. The qualitative problem becomes acute, primarily in the specialized training, advanced training, and agent training programs. In these fields of activity, basic competence and general understanding are not enough. To develop and present a seminar in a specialized field, such as [ ], or a highly technical course on a complex operational problem, such as [ ] Organizations, or a tutorial, hand-tailored unit of instruction to meet the particular requirements of a Covert Agent case, requires that the instructor possess sound operational judgment and extensive knowledge, from which he can identify and select that portion applicable to the specific training requirement. He must, in fact, be an expert, since a significant number of the trainees who participate in programs of this type are, themselves, knowledgeable, experienced individuals. While officers who possess this ability, knowledge, and judgment in several fields of activity, as is required in many Covert Agent Training projects, are admittedly few in number, it remains that only in rare instances are positions of this type filled successfully by persons less qualified.

C. Although the quantitative problem is likely to continue in existence as long as training loads remain high, it can be coped with, in part, by the direct recruitment and intensive training of personnel who lack actual clandestine experience. A large portion of the present TR(S) staff is comprised of officers serving their first tour of duty with the Agency. This has been possible, however, only because of the existence in TR(S) of a hard-core cadre of experienced officers. This group has developed the major portion of instructional content, has trained inexperienced instructors to acceptable levels of at least

theoretical competence,



theoretical competence, has planned out the patterns of training, and has served to validate the various programs by ensuring that they remain practical and realistic. In effect, existing programs are almost entirely dependent upon this cadre, and all future development completely so.

D. With the exception of three or four individuals, the membership of this cadre is comprised of personnel from the old Training Division, OSO. As a consequence, by the summer of 1951, most of them had served in a training capacity for periods ranging from two years to as long as four years, and were, therefore, anticipating a return to active operations. At the same time, a sizeable percentage of the inexperienced instructor personnel had, by the same period, served upwards of eighteen months. Personnel in this group, having themselves felt keenly their lack of experience, were desirous of shifting to overseas assignments at the earliest opportunity. In recognition of this, and with a view toward forestalling an inevitable morale problem if instructor personnel should develop a feeling that they were "stuck" in training, TR(S) undertook to work out a rotational system. Efforts to do so, which for many months occupied a substantial portion of the time of TR(S) senior officers, were not successful. Consequently, by early 1952, the morale situation did, in fact, become acute and the quality of training being provided fell off significantly, in several of the training programs.

E. In discussing this problem with many of the individuals concerned, it was clear that the question uppermost in their minds was not that of desiring immediate release, but rather one of seeking to determine what the future held for them. This being the case, and after discussion with responsible officers of OSO and OPC, a considerable number of the key instructors in TR(S) were given target dates for release ranging from six to ten months in the future, on which to base their own planning, and data concerning them were made available to the operating units. This action was taken with the expectation that, to permit appropriate assignment, similarly qualified replacements could be obtained from the operating offices.

F. Having been once reassured on the question of rotation, there occurred an observable renewal of energy on the part of the instructor staffs, and up to June 1952 TR(S) managed to cope with all but a very small percentage of the training requirements levied upon it. By June, the first of the rotational dates previously established began to fall due, but without replacement personnel either on hand or as yet identified. It was considered at this point impossible to repudiate the commitments made without serious repercussions among the remainder of TR(S) personnel. Consequently, between June and the present time, TR(S) has suffered the loss of not only an important segment of its experienced cadre, but also of a number of its senior, non-experienced officers possessing in excess of thirty months' service in Training. The loss

of these individuals,

25X1 of these individuals, because of their knowledge and experience, and familiarity with the training problems, has affected TR(S) capability disproportionately to the actual numbers involved. An additional number of officers in the same category are projected for departure within the next few months.

25X1 G. Entirely separated from the loss of critical segments of the TR(S) staff, there exists the equally important question of qualifications and talents which have never been available to TR(S). With the development of requirements from OPC for training in specialized fields of [redacted], TR(S) capability has been totally dependent upon the accidental presence within its cadre of persons with either wartime and/or immediate post-war knowledge and experience. To date, it has been able to meet requirements in a reasonably acceptable manner insofar as training content has been concerned in the fields of [redacted].

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no officers in TR(S), even though they have ideas and views, feel themselves qualified to undertake the preparation and presentation of what they consider to be adequate instructional programs. Furthermore, in many areas of training, senior TR(S) personnel feel strongly that improvement in the quality of instruction is urgently needed, but that this is possible only if at least one officer with current, up-to-date and mature experience in each field of activity can be obtained for duty in training.

H. A detailed review of the current status of TR(S), area of training by area of training, would be too lengthy for inclusion in this paper, but one or more illustrations may be pertinent:

25X9 1. The Operations Course of basic training which, as stated above, provides training in the basic operational techniques or so-called tradecraft for all fields of clandestine activity, has processed approximately [redacted] between July 1951 and July 1952. Throughout this period, the average number of instructors staffing this course has been approximately eight. Currently, only two of the officers assigned to this program possess field experience with CIA, and only two additional have had active intelligence experience in related fields. Both CIA-experienced officers are scheduled to leave TR(S) prior to 31 December. Since this course is designed to provide the basic foundation for operational competence, the quality and validity of instruction provided by it constitute an important influence on the majority of TR(S) trainees. Consequently, an investment of eight qualified and experienced case officers can exert an influence greatly disproportionate to their number.

25X1 2. Despite the fact that [redacted] is an important factor in all field

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factor in all fields of clandestine activity and must be touched upon, to a greater or lesser degree, in every major training program presented by TR(S), there are available to TR(S) only four or five officers who are experienced in this field. Since, with one exception, these officers occupy senior [redacted] positions throughout TR(S), both the development of counterespionage training content and actual instruction necessarily falls to comparatively junior personnel, resulting coverage is considered by the responsible unit chiefs and the undersigned as being dangerously inadequate.

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3. Despite the existence of heavy pressure for instructional programs in Clandestine [redacted]

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[redacted] TR(S) does not possess within its entire structure a single officer who considers himself qualified, on the basis of actual experience, to instruct in these activities. At the same time, organized doctrine and training materials have not been available within the Agency, and it has, therefore, been necessary to undertake their development from scratch with a minimum of guidance and direction. To date, TR(S) has been able to present satisfactory instruction only in [redacted]. While this program, which has resulted from many months of research and effort on the part of a single officer, has gained favorable acceptance from the operating divisions and staffs concerned, it is considered by TR(S) to represent no more than a beginning in this field. The officer concerned has done an outstanding job in the opinion of his superiors, but he, himself, feels that his lack of actual experience in clandestine operations generally, and [redacted] in particular, constitute a serious handicap to the further development of the course.

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4. In the six-week period commencing 1 August 1952, TR(S) was able to accept only 20 per cent of the agent training projects requested by the operating offices, due to lack of instructor personnel. In order to handle the eight projects which were accepted, it was necessary to divert a number of key officers from their regular duties. A total of 26 projects, ranging from singleton cases to small agent groups, were declined.

## VI. CONCLUSIONS

A. Training requirements of the clandestine services will change progressively in the future to reflect both (a) a shift in emphasis from large numbers of new employees as at present, to refresher training of employees having completed one or more tours of duty and (b) the need for more specialized and more advanced training to support the career development of personnel as they mature operationally and

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Security Information

progress to increasingly complex duty assignments. If this concept of training responsibility is endorsed by the clandestine services, then it follows that TR(S) must undertake not only to satisfy immediate, existing requirements but also, and concurrently, must invest a portion of its assets in the development of doctrine and training materials designed to service the next phases of anticipated requirements. The view that such projected requirements are important to the future of TR(S) has been more than validated by experience to date, in that month after month new and immediate requirements are being imposed by the operating units which TR(S) either cannot accept, owing to lack of qualified personnel, or can only undertake after lengthy delays to accomplish the preparation of new materials.

[REDACTED]

the capability of TR(S) will always be completely dependent upon the availability of mature and experienced instructors capable of handling this highly-individualized type of activity. TR(S) is currently able to accommodate only a small percentage of what is obviously a continuously expanding requirement, and the operating offices are already officially expressing concern that their programs are being handicapped by our inability to accept the majority of requested cases. Acting Chief, FI, has recently requested by memorandum TR(S)'s views as to when an "improvement" in TR(S) capability can be expected.

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C. In view of lack of U. S. precedent for many of the activities for which training is being requested and because of the non-existence within the Agency of satisfactory, organized training materials, it has been necessary for TR(S) itself to develop for the most part necessary doctrine and training content with a minimum of guidance and direction from the operating services. The pattern has been one of submission for authentication to the operators of course materials after lengthy research by TR(S). This obviously renders TR(S), in the discharge of its function, entirely dependent upon the availability to it of at least a cadre of highly qualified officers who are competent to plan programs of instruction and to exercise operationally mature judgment in selecting and organizing for presentation the materials necessary to accomplish widely diversified training objectives.

D. Due to the progressive loss, without replacement in most instances of its original knowledgeable cadre, TR(S) is today seriously weaker than was the case twelve months ago, and in several areas of activity it has not been supported by the operating services at all. As a consequence, valuable training which was developed and presented previously can no longer be made available at all, and in several areas, it is felt by TR(S) that its ability to maintain a satisfactory quality of instruction is seriously subject to question. This statement of the situation, disturbing as it is when examined against training loads as they existed in the summer of 1951, is made particularly acute by reason of severe expansion of loads since then.

E. Recognizing the

-12-  
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E. Recognizing the inevitability of a rotation problem with respect to both the original, experienced training cadre from the Training Division, OSD, and those instructors who, lacking experience, would, themselves, eventually seek field assignments, TR(S) has made every possible effort for more than a year to communicate to the operating offices the seriousness of its personnel requirements. Innumerable briefings, schedules for rotation of key personnel, lists of specific job vacancies and statements of required qualifications has been provided on more than several occasions. Particularly pointed out has been the fact that, in a training organization which, by function, exists for the exclusive purpose of providing experience and "know how" to others, there must be present as part of the structure a highly qualified, experienced staff to ensure the validity and soundness of the instruction. It has always been accepted by TR(S) that the full instructor requirement cannot be met with experienced personnel for some years to come, but it is felt at the same time that, without an essential minimum of such personnel, an acceptable clandestine operations training program is impossible.

#### VII. RECOMMENDATION


A. It is recommended:

1. That the leadership of the clandestine services be requested to review the problem of training to determine its desirable scope and objectives. Specifically, it is recommended that said officers be requested to endorse or modify the TR(S) function as outlined in this memorandum.

2. That a policy decision be obtained as to whether TR(S) can, in terms of other commitments of the operating services, expect to receive on a duty assignment basis experienced replacements and/or appointees to fill the key positions in TR(S) as a matter of future procedure.

3. If the decisions on 1. and 2. are negative, that TR(S) be authorized to discontinue specialized training and project training, in order to permit consolidation of its existing personnel assets in the presentation of a single basic clandestine

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Deputy Director of Training (Special)

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